Extraneous menu-effects influence financial decisions made by pension trustees by Weiss-Cohen, L. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Weiss-Cohen, L., Ayton, P. ORCID: 0000-0003-2285-4608 and Clacher, I. 
(2019). Extraneous menu-effects influence financial decisions made by pension trustees. 
Economics Letters, 108895.. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108895 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/23358/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108895
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
Economics Letters c©2019. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108895





City University of London
Iain Clacher
University of Leeds
Pension scheme trustees are responsible for the investment decisions of future generations’
retirement assets. However, behavioural finance research has mostly focussed on retail in-
vestors. While trustees are relatively sophisticated investors, they are not immune from biases.
Across three experiments, we tested 252 pension scheme trustees for the influence of extrane-
ous manipulations to the menu of options on investment decisions. Trustees were influenced
by changes to the menu item mix, context, and layout. Care should therefore be taken when
preparing information presented to trustees, in order to reduce biases that can be detrimental to
pension outcomes.
Introduction
Trustees are the true custodians of future generations’ re-
tirement incomes, controlling US$27.6 trillion in pension
fund assets in the OECD countries in 2018, equivalent to
57% of their GDP.1 The ubiquity of behavioural finance bi-
ases with individual investors is well-established (for a com-
prehensive review, see Barberis & Thaler, 2003), but its ex-
tension into institutional investors such as pension trustees
remains relatively unexplored. This is a surprising oversight,
given that the influence of pension trustees is concentrated,
systemic and overarching: Investment decisions made by a
few trustees can move markets, influence the real economy,
and ultimately impact global financial well-being.
It is reasonable to expect that trustees are more financially
sophisticated than individual investors (Menkhoff, Schmel-
ing, & Schmidt, 2009). Pension trustees have access to
information and training, have more direct experience in
financial markets, and are in constant receipt of advice
(Myners, 2001). However, sophistication does not inoculate
an individual against behavioural biases (West, Meserve, &
Stanovich, 2012).
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Ideally, the financial decisions made by investors should
be based on underlying financial fundamentals. In our cur-
rent research, we explore the influence that extraneous non-
financial information can have on the financial decisions of
trustees, by manipulating the presentation of choice menus.
Research has shown that menu design, or "subtle varia-
tions in the presentation of options," can influence decisions
across many domains (Fox, Ratner, & Lieb, 2005, p.547),
which Dellavigna (2009) has called "menu effects." For ex-
ample, choices can be influenced by adding irrelevant decoys
(Simonson, 1989); by changing the menu size (Sela, Berger,
& Liu, 2009); by framing the same alternative as an extreme
or middle choice (Benartzi & Thaler, 2002); and by changing
the menu layout (Dayan & Bar-Hillel, 2011).
Pension scheme trustees
We captured data from 252 pension scheme trustees (Age:
M=59.4 years; Males: N=210). Access to trustees was pro-
vided by Aon UK, an investment consultant. Trustees com-
pleted three experiments,2 with some trustees participating
in multiple experiments.
Our sample included 133 member-nominated and 119
1OECD Pension Funds in Figures 2018:
www.oecd.org/daf/pensions/gps.




employer-nominated3 trustees. Member-nominated trustees
are less sophisticated than their employer-nominated coun-
terparts: The former have less experience working as trustees
(8.6 vs. 11.4 years, p=.004), fewer have professional accred-
itations (25% vs. 51%, p<.001), work experience in a fi-
nancial role (22% vs. 53%, p<.001), personal investments
(70% vs. 85%, p=.008), and answered fewer correct ques-
tions in a 14-question financial literacy test (11.96 vs. 12.72,
p=.003). Age, gender, and differences in expertise match
those in Clark, Caerlewy-Smith, and Marshall (2007, and
references therein) and Myners (2001).
Experiment 1: Menu items
Benartzi and Thaler (2001) have shown that lay individ-
uals will allocate their own assets evenly across the alter-
natives provided, regardless of the underlying intrinsic na-
ture of each option. When there were more bond funds
than equity funds in the menu of alternatives, participants’
allocations were more bond-heavy, and vice-versa âĂŞ- a
phenomenon they called "naive diversification." We tested
if trustees also diversified naively when distributing assets
across different mixes of investment alternatives.
Design
Trustees (N=119) were asked how they would allocate
the assets of a pension scheme across a selection of mutual
funds. Our experiment employed a 2 x 3 between-subjects
design: there were either two or four fund options; and
the options were either balanced (half bonds, half equities),
equity-heavy (3/4 equities, 1/4 bonds), or bond-heavy (1/4
equities, 3/4 bonds). In the two-fund condition the imbal-
ance was achieved by introducing a mixed fund, which was
half bonds and half equities.
Results
The investment balance across bonds and equities was in-
fluenced by the mix of options available (F(2,114)=23.75,
p<.001). The mean allocations into bonds in the bond-heavy,
balanced, and equity-heavy conditions were 69.7%, 61.3%
and 43.9%, respectively. Participants displayed naive di-
versification, changing allocations according to the mix of
options provided, seemingly without basing it on informed
principles. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) found a similar pat-
tern with lay individuals, with the proportion of assets in-
vested in bonds depending strongly on the proportion of bond
funds offered. This pattern was not different between two
and four options (p=.24), and not different between member-
nominated and employer-nominated trustees (p=.42), with
both trustee types showing the same bias.
Experiment 2: Menu context
Sela et al. (2009) shows that choice is influenced when
the same options are labelled differently, changing the con-
text in which the options are evaluated. We tested if a similar
extraneous labelling of fund options would affect investment
decisions, as proposed by Benartzi and Thaler (2002). We
labelled different funds as the "moderate" option in different
conditions, therefore putting different options within differ-
ent contexts.
Design
Trustees (N=111) were asked to choose a single asset mix
across bonds and equities for their pension scheme, from 11
options. Each mix was associated with a predicted range of
incomes at retirement. Both income and risk increased with
higher allocations into equities, which ranged from 0% to
100%, in steps of 10%, with the remainder in bonds (adapted
from Vlaev, Chater, & Stewart, 2007).
There were three between-subjects conditions, which ma-
nipulated the labelling of some of the options. In the Label-
30% condition, the option with 30% in bonds was labelled as
"moderate," while in the Label-70% condition the moderate
option allocated 70% into bonds. Two further options were
labelled in relation to the moderate: the option with 20%
more bonds than the moderate was labelled "conservative;"
and the option with 20% less bonds was labelled "aggres-
sive." In the Control condition, options were not labelled.
Results
The proportion of assets allocated to bonds was influenced
by the labelling (Kruskal-Wallis χ2(2)=6.89, p=.032). In
the Label-30% condition, the mean bond allocation (29.8%)
was lower than in the Label-70% condition (38.9%), with
3Including professional trustees.
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the Control condition near the average (34.8%). This effect
was observed only with member-nominated trustees, who are
less experienced (pHolm=.033): their modal selection was the
30%-bond fund in the Label-30% condition and the 60%-
bond fund in the Label-70% condition. This is consistent
with past research showing that individuals prefer the middle
option in the absence of stable well-defined preferences (Be-
nartzi and Thaler, 2002). Employer-nominated trustees, who
are more experienced, displayed stronger preferences resis-
tant to labelling, by choosing the 20% and 30% funds most
frequently for the Label-30% and Label-70% conditions re-
spectively (pHolm=.73).
Experiment 3: Menu layout
We tested how the layout of information and restric-
tions on search influenced behaviour, using a variation of
the "Mouselab" paradigm, which tracks how information is
searched (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). Participants
were presented with tables containing initially hidden in-
formation about mutual funds, in cells they could click-to-
reveal. The search patterns can be used to determine the rel-
evance of different information items.
Design
Trustees (N=122) were asked to choose between two mu-
tual funds, across ten different asset classes. The information
was presented as a 9 x 2 table, with the nine information
items along rows (see Figure 1 for the items and their or-
dering), and the two funds across columns. Each cell was
initially hidden, and participants could click to reveal them
in any order they chose.
The maximum number of clicks was manipulated accord-
ing to experimental condition. In the Control condition, they
could reveal as many items as they wished. In the Restricted-
10 and Restricted-6 conditions, participants were limited to
ten and six clicks for each asset class, respectively. After
each fund selection, the process started again for the next
asset class.
Results
We calculated an index of deviation from uninformed be-
haviour, which we defined as following the menu layout by
clicking each item sequentially along the list, from top to bot-
tom for each fund. The index was zero for participants who
followed this pattern precisely, and higher for participants
who deviated from the presented order by targeting specific
information, with a maximum value of 16.
There was a significant influence of the search restriction
on the deviation index (χ2(2)=73.33, p<.001). The deviation
was significantly lower in the Control condition (M=2.75)
than in the Restricted-10 (M=4.76, p<.001) and Restricted-6
conditions (M=5.43, p<.001). Participants followed the lay-
out of choices very closely when there was no limit to the
number of clicks but appear to have considered their search
pattern more carefully when their number of clicks was re-
stricted (Figure 1). In the restricted conditions, they prior-
itized what could arguably be considered the most impor-
tant information for a pension scheme: long-term returns,


























Figure 1. Proportion that each information was revealed at each sequential click number in Experiment 3. The informa-
tion items are listed in the same order as displayed to participants. The diagonal represents following the provided layout
sequentially.
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fees, and risk. Payne et al. (1988) have similarly shown how
search constraints helped subjects selectively focus on a sub-
set of information. There was no difference between types of
trustees (p=.09).
Discussion
Our experiments show that the financial decisions made
by pension trustees are influenced by extraneous menu-
effects, instead of following underlying financial principles
such as choosing an optimal allocation between bonds and
equities, or focusing on long-term returns, fees and risks.
While all trustees were influenced by the mix of choices
and the layout of information (Experiments 1 and 3), only
the less financially sophisticated member-nominated trustees
were influenced by framing (Experiment 2). Shapira and
Venezia (2001) also reported that professional experience re-
duced, but did not eliminate, investment decision biases. Re-
stricting information search, a type of environmental nudge,
was also found to help trustees focus on more relevant infor-
mation.
Fox et al. (2005) suggested that the method of describ-
ing the possible alternatives is perceived by the decision-
maker as communicating relevant information, even when it
is determined by arbitrary factors. If menu manipulations
can influence behaviour as shown here, then care must be
given when preparing information to be used by trustees.
Advisors, such as investment consultants, should be aware
of this to try to reduce biases in trustee decision-making,
as such biases are likely to be detrimental to the pension
outcomes of members due to inappropriate asset allocation
and/or risk-taking. This issue is particularly relevant as the
ageing population puts additional pressure on well-managed
private pensions to provide retirement income. Policy mak-
ers need to understand the influence of choice menus on
pension trustees’ financial decision-making when designing
training for trustees, and we encourage further research in
this area.
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